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Are Minimum Quality Standards Acting as Nontariff Trade Barriers? 
 
Governments  throughout  the  world  frequently  permit  producers  of  agricultural  commodities  to 
undertake  collective  action.  Enhancement  or  maintenance  of  product  quality  is  often  cited  as  a 
justification. The Agriculture Marketing Agreement Act (AMAA) of 1937, for example, authorized 
the  formation  of  federal  marketing  orders  that  allow  U.S.  producers  of  a  particular  agricultural 
commodity in a specific region of the country to act collectively. Marketing orders can impose 
quality regulations and inspections, perform production and processing research, control the volume 
of product brought to market and/or conduct other supply-management practices. Producers of fruit, 
vegetables, or other specialty crops enter into marketing order agreements voluntarily. In order to 
implement or amend a marketing order, a two-thirds or larger majority by number or volume of 
production is required (USDA, 2007).
1  
In 1954, the AMAA was amended to include section 8e, which specifies that imports are 
subject  to  the  same  quality  standards,  regulations,  and  other  provisions  as  are  imposed  upon 
domestic production by a marketing order. According to the USDA (2007): 
 section  8e quality  requirements are  intended  to  (1)  develop  dependable  markets  for 
products  by  ensuring  consumer  satisfaction  and  encouraging  repeat  purchases,  (2) 
promote buyer satisfaction and increased sales for those commodities by ensuring that 
only acceptable quality products are in the U.S. market place, and (3) help avoid market 
disruption associated with poor quality offerings. 
 
Due to the seasonality of agricultural production, most foreign production complements, rather 
than competes, with domestic production. In order to comply with the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and  Trade  (GATT)  Article  III  requirement  that  imports  are  not  held  to  higher  standards  than 
domestic production, section 8e requirements are only in effect when domestic production is being 
produced, regulated, and shipped (USDA, 2007).  
                                                 
1 A three-fourths majority is required by California citrus producers.    2 
Both  foreign  and  domestic  shipments  of  commodities  regulated  under  marketing  order 
legislation must be inspected and obtain certification before reaching domestic marketing channels. 
If a shipment does not meet the requirements necessary for importation, handlers have three options: 
(i) recondition the shipment for re-inspection, (ii) re-export the shipment, or (iii) send the shipment 
to an exempt use. Product imported to the U.S. for processing, animal feed, charity or relief, certified 
seeds, or government agencies is exempt from section 8e requirements (USDA, 2007).  
Of  the  31  marketing  orders  currently  operating  under  the  federal  statutes,  29  have  some 
combination of grade, size, quality, or maturity provisions authorized or in effect (USDA, 2007).
2 
Currently, 16 of the 31 commodities regulated under federal marketing order statutes are subject to 
section 8e requirements of the AMAA. Among this group, 16 have altered these requirements at 
least once over the previous 10 years (AMS, 2006). 
Heterogeneous growing conditions and differential access to production and quality-enhancing 
technologies and skilled labor could create substantial disparities in domestic vs. foreign producers’ 
abilities to produce a product with a given level of quality. Additionally, due to the perishable and 
fragile nature of many agricultural products, the time and physical stress involved in shipment can 
also act as a disadvantage for importers. Such factors may enable a marketing board to strategically 
select the product attributes to regulate such that they favor domestic producers, making compliance 
with a MQS more difficult for importing countries. In these cases federal marketing order boards 
could set quality regulations that reduce or eliminate import competition, thus acting as restraints on 
trade and constituting nontariff trade barriers.  
The goal of this paper is to analyze the impacts of a MQS imposed by a federal marketing order, 
or similar producer organization, in a model that incorporates contemporary methodology from the 
                                                 
2 25 of the federal marketing orders have minimum grade standards in place, 25 have size regulations in authorized or in 
effect, and 3 have general “quality” regulations in effect.    3 
general economics literature on MQS, the key characteristics of agricultural production, and the 
endogenous nature of the decision of whether or not to adopt a MQS. In the theoretical model, I 
incorporate  the  Mussa-Rosen  (1978)  specification  for  consumer  preferences  for  quality  and 
characterize the supply side of the model with a simple ex ante distribution of low- and high-quality 
production. Further, I allow the ex ante quality distribution to be altered by producers undertaking 
actions to enhance product quality at a cost. 
The theoretical model unfolds in two stages. Given producers’ ability to act collectively via 
authorizing legislation, the domestic industry chooses whether or not to impose a MQS in stage 1 
based  upon  a  profit  maximization  criterion.  In  stage  2,  individual  producers  make  production 
decisions  independently.  Because  product  attributes  regulated  by  marketing  programs  are  often 
visual (e.g., size, blemishes, cosmetic defects, etc.) and, thus, observable to consumers, we retain the 
perfect information assumption utilized in the general economics literature on MQS (e.g., Ronnen, 
1991; Crampes and Hollander, 1995; Ecchia and Lambertini, 1997) and the more recent papers on 
MQS in agricultural industries (e.g., Bockstael, 1984; Chambers and Pick, 1994).  
In a free-trade scenario when the quality distribution is immutable, an advantage for the domestic 
country in producing high quality relative to the foreign country increases the domestic country’s’ 
incentive to impose a MQS. Because more of the costs of the MQS in terms of foregone sales of 
low-quality product are borne by the foreign country, the domestic country is able to capture a larger 
share of the advantage of removing the self-selection constraint due to its greater share of H product. 
Additionally, the model predicts that if the domestic country is able to drive the foreign country out 
of the market by using a raising-rivals’-cost strategy, consumer welfare will necessarily decline 
relative  to  both  the  no-MQS  scenario  and  the  MQS  scenario  where  both  domestic  and  foreign 
countries produce. Because the foreign country exiting causes a reduction in the high-quality product   4 
available on the market, the price of the high-quality product increases and fewer consumers are 
served. Additionally, the deadweight loss (DWL) to society is larger when the foreign country is 
driven out of the market because, in addition to the destruction of the low-quality product due to the 
imposition  of  the  MQS,  the  high-quality  product  from  the  foreign  country  no  longer  reaches 
consumers, thereby increasing the DWL associated with the domestic country imposing a MQS 
when the foreign country is driven out of the import market.  
The  empirical  evidence  surrounding  the  impacts  on  trade  from  standards  in  general  is 
extremely limited (Maskus and Wilson, 2000), and empirical research specifically related to affects 
of MQS on trade patterns is essentially nonexistent. To test if changes in MQS imposed by federal 
marketing  orders  are  influencing  trade  patterns,  I  describe  a  double-hurdle  version  of  a  gravity 
equation model estimable using disaggregate commodity-level data. Gravity-equation models have 




I consider a vertically differentiated commodity which can either be high-quality (H) or low-quality 
(L), where consumers always prefer H over L. Total output, X, is exogenous (e.g., it is based upon 
prior planting decisions). The exogenous ex ante share of total output that is low quality is denoted 
as ,  where  0 1 < <   .  Thus,  the  ex  ante  amounts  of  H  and  L  product  are  (1 )X     and  X   , 
respectively. Costs of producing output are sunk and do not enter into the analysis. 
Although total output is exogenous, producers are often able to undertake activities to increase 
the proportion of H product by enhancing or “transforming” ex ante L product to H.
3 We assume that 
product that would be L in the absence of quality-enhancing activities can be transformed by the 
                                                 
3 Examples of transformation include the application of pesticides to reduce pest damage, thinning of fruit to increase 
size, and delaying harvest to increase ripeness.    5 
industry into H product through a convex “transformation cost function”, which for simplicity we 
model in quadratic form,  
(1) 
2 ( ) 0.5 = C T T   , 
where [0, ]   T X    is the amount of L product transformed to H, and    ,  0 <   <   , is a parameter 
that calibrates the marginal cost of quality enhancement.
4 For example,   would depend upon the 
nature of the product and availability and cost of quality-enhancing inputs, such as herbicides and 
pesticides, and other complementary inputs, such as labor. 
Although  suppliers,  through  quality  enhancement,  can  choose  the  proportions  of  H  and  L 
products that they produce, I assume they cannot choose the magnitude of the quality of either the H 
or L product. Consequently, the quality level of the H product,  H q , is normalized to 1.0, the quality 
of the L product is  = L q   , where  1   < , and, hence,   is the relative quality level of the L product.
5 
  Following Mussa and Rosen (1978), there is a continuum of consumers in the market who are 
indexed by a taste parameter for quality, ,    and who are uniformly distributed on [0, 1] with density, 
D, normalized to 1.0. Each consumer derives utility from only the first unit of the commodity that 
she  purchases.  A  consumer  with  taste  parameter      has  utility  ( , ) U q q     = and  surplus 
   CSH( ,P) =    P from consuming a unit of the H product or CSL( , , p) =     p from consuming 
a unit of the L product, where P represents the price of the H product and p represents the price of 
the L product. Based on these utility functions, we can identify a type of demand function for each 
product based solely upon consumers’ willingness to pay for the H and L products in isolation. 
                                                 
4  Much  of  the  contemporary  literature  on  MQS  uses  this  cost  specification  to  represent  the  cost  associated  with 
augmenting quality (e.g., Ronnen, 1991; Ecchia and Lambertini, 1997; Maxwell; 1997; Valletti, 2000; Zhou, Spencer, 
and Vertinsky, 2002).  
5This assumption is a simplification for modeling purposes, but may hold literally in instances when quality designations 
are based upon standards set by government or by the producer organization itself, and consumers utilize those standards 
as proxies for true quality.   6 
These functions express the individual rationality (IR) condition that no consumer will purchase a 
product that yields her negative net utility: 
(2)          1 , (1 ) =   =  
IR IR
H L Q P Q p   . 
These functions lack much significance when both the H and L products are on the market, but they 
are important in this paper because we are studying the implications of eliminating the L product 
from the market through a MQS. 
When no MQS is imposed, consumers can choose freely between the H and L products and 
may also elect to consume neither. This aspect of self selection constrains pricing for the H product 
in a way that may make it advantageous for an industry to impose a MQS. To study consumer choice 
in the Mussa-Rosen framework, note that the consumer who is indifferent between consuming the H 
product and the L product is represented by taste parameter 
     
   
0 =
P   p
1  
,while the consumer who is 
indifferent between consuming the L product and not consuming the product at all, and accordingly 
obtaining  CSL = 0 , is represented by    =
p
 
. Note that in general the condition determining the 
location of 
0     is a self-selection condition in the sense that this consumer is indifferent between 
consuming  H  and  L  product  and  obtains  positive  surplus  from  either  choice: 
0 0 ( , ) ( , ) 0 = >    
H L CS P CS p     , whereas the location of   is determined by an IR condition because 
the consumer with taste parameter  obtains  ( , ) 0 = L CS p   . 
The  respective  demands  for  the  H  and  L  products  that  account  for  the  presence  of  both 
products on the market and consumers’ ability to choose are: 
(3) 
 
QH =1     
0 =1 
P   p
1  
   7 
(4) 
 
QL =    
0    =






Inverting the system of equations comprised of (3) and (4) results in the indirect demand functions:  
(5)          P =1 QH   QL, 
(6)          (1 ) . =     H L p Q Q    
It  is  assumed  throughout  that  the  potential  demand  for  the  commodity  exceeds  the  sum  of  the 
exogenous output, which implies 1 < X , given that the total number of consumers in the market is 
normalized to 1.0. Thus, X has the interpretation of the product’s market penetration, i.e., the share 
of consumers who purchase the product in the no-MQS equilibrium.  
 
Asymmetric Exogenous Quality, Perfectly Competitive Markets, and Trade 
I consider a case where a domestic industry (D) faces competition from an importing country (F).  
For simplicity, both countries are assumed to have equal shares of the total production, X, such that 
XD = XF = X / 2 , but there is no reason to expect that different market shares between domestic and 
foreign producers should play an important role in decision making regarding a MQS. However, 
differences in land quality, weather conditions, and access to technology may cause countries to 
produce different distributions of H and L products, so in this scenario, I allow D and F to have 
different proportions,   Dand    F of L product. Although I make no assumptions about the magnitude 
of    Drelative to    F , the case of most direct relevance is   F >   Dbecause the D country producers 
can choose to regulate those product attributes where they have an advantage relative to outside 
competitors. 
 
   8 
Stage 2: Prices in the Presence and Absence of the MQS 
I begin with the simplest case where the exogenous distribution of H and L quality is immutable and 
cannot be altered by production practices in either country. The profits for producers in country i 
when a MQS is not imposed are  
 
0 0 0.5[ ( ) ( )] =   + i i i P X X p X        for  , i D F = . 
From (5) and (6), substituting the exogenous quantities in place of QH and QL yields the equilibrium 
prices: 
0 1 0.5 [2 ( )(1 )] =     +   D F P X        
(1 ) =   p X    
where  the  superscript  0  denotes  the  no-MQS  equilibrium.  The  price  of  the  L  product,  p ,  is 
determined by the market-clearing or individual-rationality constraint that the marginal consumer is 
just willing to purchase the L product, while the H price, 
0 P , is determined by the self-selection 
condition that the marginal consumer of the H product is indifferent between consuming the H 
product at 
0 P and the L product at  p .  
The implementation of a binding MQS in this model eliminates the L product from the market, 
making it worthless. In the presence of the MQS, P is no longer determined by the self-selection 
condition given by (5), but rather, the market clearing condition given by (2).  Under a MQS, the 
profits are  
      i
1 = 0.5[P
1(X    iX)] for  , i D F =  
where     P
1 =1  0.5X[2   D    F]  is  found  by  replacing  the  exogenous  volume  of  high-quality 
production into (2) and solving for P.  
   9 
Stage 1: The Implementation Decision 
An increase in either country’s proportion of L product increases the price of the H product for a 
given X, with or without a MQS, and, thus, causes the other country’s profit to increase, ceteris 
paribus.  In  this,  the  exogenous  quality-level  scenario,  the  change  in  country  i’s  profits  from 
imposing  the  MQS  is    i = (P
1   P
0)(1   )(X / 2)  p  (X / 2)  for  i=D,  F.    idepends  on  two 
offsetting effects: (i) the price effect, which is the change in revenue that results from the MQS-
induced price increase for the H product, and (ii) the wastage effect, which is the revenue lost from 
being unable to sell the L product under the MQS.  
The price effect of the MQS on profits is always positive, while the wastage effect causes 
producer profits to decline. The sign of the difference in the price effect and the wastage effect 
determines whether or not it is optimal for domestic producers to impose a MQS in this setting. It 
should also be noted that the profit levels are not symmetric due to the asymmetry in the proportions 
of the L product in each country. Consequently, the D country could impose a MQS, based upon a 
profit maximization criterion that would be harmful to the F country.  
Figure 1 depicts isoprofit contours, constructed by equating domestic producer profits with and 
without a MQS, given alternative proportions of L product produced by F. In the parameter space 
that lies above an isoprofit contour a MQS reduces domestic profits (i.e.,     D < 0), while in the 
parameter space below an isoprofit line a MQS increases domestic industry profits (i.e.,     D > 0).  
The figure demonstrates the proposition that, in a free-trade scenario, an advantage for the D country 
in producing high quality relative to the F country enlarges the parameter space when the D country 
wishes to impose a MQS because more of the costs of the MQS in terms of foregone sales of L 
product are borne by the F country, while the D country is able to capture a larger share of the 
advantage of removing the self-selection constraint due to its greater share of H product.   10 
Consumers are necessarily harmed by the imposition of the MQS in the exogenous-quality 
scenario.  The  price  of  the  H  product  unambiguously  increases,  causing  the  surplus  of  the  H 
consumers to decrease. Individuals who consumed the L product in the absence of the MQS do not 
consume the product in the presence of the MQS and thereby receive zero surplus.  
The deadweight loss (DWL) associated with the imposition of the MQS in the exogenous-
quality scenario is the sum of the surplus lost by L product consumers and the loss in seller revenue 
associated with the elimination of the L market. 
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MQS as a Raising-Rivals’-Cost Strategy 
Raising rivals’ costs (RRC) refers to the notion that firms may be able to induce rivals to exit or to 
compete less aggressively by raising their costs and may include actions that raise the costs of inputs 
or cause detrimental regulations to be imposed (Salop and Scheffman, 1983, 1987).  Such strategies 
may be profitable even if they raise the predatory firm’s costs if they raise rivals’ costs by more. The 
D country producers may also be able to use a MQS as a strategic tool to gain advantage by harming 
international competitors through a type of raising-rivals’-costs phenomenon.  
In  the  present  context  a  MQS  has  a  RRC  effect  under  the  section  8e  requirement  by  (a) 
preventing the sale of L product and (b) inducing sellers to transform more L product to H than they 
otherwise would do in those environments when quality enhancement is possible. 
The RRC phenomenon may be especially important in an international trade context because of 
the  well-documented  fact  that  the  decision  to  export  involves  significant  sunk  start-up  costs 
(Krugman, 1989; Dixit, 1989; Roberts and Tybout, 1995). Campa (1993) showed empirically that 
the magnitude of sunk costs significantly deters firms entering into export markets.  Thus, a rational 
response by a domestic agricultural industry to trade liberalization and the evolution of potentially 
competing industries in other countries may be to impose a MQS that reduces the variable profits 
from  trade  of  potential  international  competitors.    The  MQS  is  sufficient  to  deter  international 
competition if the discounted variable profit stream from entering exportation to the D country in the 
presence of the MQS is less than the sunk start-up costs. 
Of course, the mere fact that a MQS may be sufficient to deter entry by a foreign competitor 
does not mean that it is in the interests of the D country’s producers to impose it. The relevant 
comparison for the D country producers is their profit in a free-trade equilibrium with no MQS 
relative to their profit in an autarkic equilibrium with a MQS.  The RRC phenomenon and the D   12 
country’s decision calculus are illustrated in figure 2.  The figure is drawn for parameter values of X 
= 0.5 (split equally between D and F producers) and  0.5   = , but the general principles illustrated by 
the figure apply for other values of X and  .  The curve  D 0    = depicts  (  D,  F)combinations that 
hold the D producers’ profit constant in the presence or absence of a MQS.  All combinations of 
D F ( , )     that lie below the curve represent distributions of L product between D and F that would 
cause the D producers to impose a MQS. This curve is increasing in  F   ,reflecting the proposition 
noted earlier that a MQS is more beneficial for the D country, the higher the proportion of F country 
production that is low quality. 
The similar curve that holds the F producers’ profit constant is labeled  F 0    = .  Thus, a MQS 
reduces the foreign producers’ variable profits for all  D F ( , )     combinations that lie to the right of 
this curve, and, thus, this parameter space represents the region where a MQS has a RRC effect.  
Finally,  the  curve  labeled   D
* = 0represents  D F ( , )     combinations  where  domestic  producers’ 
profits are the same in a free-trade equilibrium with no MQS and an autarkic MQS equilibrium, 
where the latter equilibrium would result from the MQS deterring entry by foreign producers.  Thus, 
all  D F ( , )       combinations  that  lie  below     D
* = 0,  above D 0    = ,  and  to  the  right  of  the 
F 0    = curve  (i.e.,  the  shaded  area  in  figure  2)  represent  market  configurations  where  the  D 
producers could impose a MQS due to its RRC effect but otherwise would not elect to impose it, 
because the D producers’ profits are lower under the MQS in this parameter space in a free-trade 
equilibrium.  Of  course,  without  making  additional  assumptions  about  the  magnitude  of  the  F 
producers sunk costs of exportation, we cannot state which market configurations in the shaded area 
deter foreign competition.  The key point is that in the presence of exporter sunk costs, the range of   13 
market conditions when the D country wishes to impose a MQS is expanded, with the extent of the 
expansion being dependent upon the magnitude of the sunk costs.
6 
If  D  is  able  to  drive  F  out  of  the  market  by  using  a  RRC  strategy,  consumer  welfare  will 
necessarily decline, relative to both the no-MQS scenario and the MQS scenario where both D and F 
produce. Because F exiting causes a reduction in the H product available on the market, the price of 
the H product increases and fewer consumers are served. Additionally, the DWL to society is larger 
when F is driven out of the market because, in addition to the destruction of the L product due to the 
imposition of the MQS, the H product from F no longer reaches consumers. Thereby increasing the 
DWL associated with D imposing a MQS when F is driven out of the import market.  
 
Figure 2. Raising Rivals’ Costs 
 
                                                 
6 Although it plays no role in this analysis, worth noting is that domestic industries may also be able to pursue policies 
that increase these costs for exporters.   14 
 
Symmetric Endogenous Quality Enhancement, Perfectly Competitive Markets, and Trade 
In this scenario, I consider the imposition of a MQS in a model where quality enhancement is 
endogenous and D and F interact in a perfectly competitive market setting. To simplify this case, I 
assume complete symmetry between the D and F producers: (i) each country has half of the total 
exogenous output ( /2
D F X X X = = ), (ii) the shares of L product available to each country are the 
same  (   D =   F =   ),  and  (iii)  each  is  equally  efficient  at  transforming  L  product  to  H 
( D F       = = ).  
 
Stage 2: Prices and Production in the Presence and Absence of the MQS 
To  derive  the  supply  curve  for  quality  enhancement  when  the  two  countries  engage  in  trade, 
differentiate the cost function of each country to obtain its marginal cost, which due to symmetry is 
MC(T) =  T for both D and F. Quality enhancement also involves an indirect or opportunity cost in 
the no-MQS case because each unit of L product transformed to H cannot be sold in the L market at 
price p. Thus, the full marginal cost of transformation in the no-MQS equilibrium is   T + p. The 
competitive market optimum for transformation, T
0 , is determined by  P
0(T
0) =  T
0 + p. Solving 
for T
0  yields T
0 = (P
0   p)/    where P
0   p is the price premium for selling H product rather then 
L. However transformation is limited by each countries ex ante availability of L product,  (X / 2). 
To  find  the  level  of  P  where  the  total  available  quality  of  L  product  is  transformed,  solve 
2  (X / 2) = (P
0   p)/   . Thus, the market supply of transformation in the free trade case is  
(7)         
   
T =
2(P
0   p) /   if (P
0   p) <   (X / 2)
  X if (P




   
.   15 
  Equating (7) with the demand for quality enhancement yields the total amount of L product 
transformed to H product collectively by D and F in competitive equilibrium (subscript “C”) with no 
MQS (superscript “0”): 
0 2(1 )[ 1 ]
2 2
     
=  




   
 
   
.
7 
Because D and F have symmetric costs, each transforms the same amount of product:
0 /2 C T . 
0
C T  is 
the socially optimal level of transformation because it equates producers’ cost of enhancing product 
quality with consumers’ willingness to pay for H product instead of L. From (5) and (6), the prices 
for the H and L products in the competitive equilibrium with no MQS are 
   
P C
0 =1  X[1   (1  )] TC
0(1  )
=
[X +   X    X  1]  + 2 (1  )(X  1)
2        2
,  
   pC = (1  X)  , 
respectively.  
Imposition of a MQS alters the market in a fundamental way. As a consequence of preventing 
the sale of the L product, consumers are no longer able to substitute between L and H products, 
eliminating the self-selection constraint on the market. Instead the conditional that determines the 
equilibrium price for the high-quality product is the market-clearing or willingness-to-pay constraint 
given  in  (2).  The  market’s  supply  of  quality  enhancement  is  also  altered  by  the  MQS  because 
transformation of L product to H no longer involves the opportunity cost of selling the product as L. 
Thus, the market’s inverse supply curve is no longer shifted vertically up by  pC  subject to the 
                                                 
7 While it is possible that the entire amount of ex ante L product is transformed to H, TC
0 =   X , the relevant case to this 
discussion is when TC
0 <   X . If TC
0 =   X , imposition of the MQS is irrelevant because all product is transformed 
from L to H without imposition of a standard.    16 
constraint  T     X . Therefore, from the perspective of the industry, imposing a MQS raises the 
market’s demand for transformation and reduces the marginal cost of transformation.  
Adjusting (7) to account for the absence of the opportunity cost of selling the L product and 
equating this modified version with the demand for quality enhancement under a MQS yields the 
total amount of L product transformed to H collectively by D and F in the competitive equilibrium in 
the presence of an MQS. When the constraint on L product available to transform does not bind, the 
solution is the following: 
   
ˆ TC
1 =
2[1  X +  X]
  + 2
. 
To include the possibility that the ex ante level of L product limits the amount transformed, the level 
of transformation in the presence of the MQS in the free-trade competitive equilibrium is 
TC
1 = min{ ˆ TC
1,  X}. 
Each country transforms half of this total, 
1 /2 C T , given their symmetry. Substituting  TC
1, into (5) 
with QL = 0 yields the equilibrium price for the H product in the presence of the MQS: 
P C
1 =
 [1  X +  X]
  + 2
if TC
1 <   X
1  X if TC




   
. 
   
The difference in the amount of product transformed in equilibrium is 




2  [X  1   X]
(  + 2)(2        2)
> 0. 
Thus, countries transform more of the L product to H when a MQS is imposed.  Since TC
0  is the 
socially optimal level of transformation, the increased level of transformation induced by the MQS is 
excessive  for  a  societal  viewpoint  and  is  one  source  of  welfare  loss  that  results  from  the   17 
implementation of a MQS. The second source of societal loss results from producers’ inability to sell 
and consumer’s inability to consume the L product that is not transformed to H in equilibrium. 
While producer profits must increase for the MQS to be imposed, consumer welfare necessarily 
decreases due to the price increase.  
 
Stage 1: The MQS Implementation Decision with Endogenous Quality Enhancement 
The profits for producers in country i in the no-MQS and MQS equilibria are 
      i
0 = 0.5[P C
0(X    X +TC
0)+ pC(  X  TC
0)  0.25 (TC
0)
2] for  , i D F =  
      i
1 = 0.5[P C
1(X    X +T
1)  0.25 (T
1)
2] for  , i D F = . 
The D industry will choose to implement a MQS if     D =   D
1    D
0 > 0. It is helpful to breakdown 
the overall impact into components. The price effect when quality-enhancement is possible is the 
change in revenue that results from the MQS-induced change in the price of the H product that 
would have been produced and sold in the no-MQS equilibrium,  0.5(P C
1   P C
0)[(1   )X +TC
0]. The 
wastage  effect  is  the  revenue  lost  from  L  product  that  is  not  transformed  under  the  MQS, 
 0.5p(  X  TC
1). A third component, called the quality-enhancement effect, is the change in revenue 
generated from the sale of the incremental H product created by the additional transformation under 
the MQS,  0.5(P C
1   P C
0)(TC
1  TC
0)  0.25 [(TC
1)
2   (TC
0)
2]. The profitability of the implementation of 
the MQS for D depends on the sign of the sum of the three effects.  
Assuming no raising-rivals’-cost effect such that the F country continues to export to D, a 
necessary condition for the D producers to impose a MQS is that  P rise, because the wastage effect 
is always negative.  However, raising-rivals’-costs considerations may arise in this trade case as 
well, even though the D and F industries are modeled as symmetric, so long as the F producers incur   18 
fixed costs of exporting that the D producers do not incur. Similar to the trade model with no quality 
enhancement, market configurations that reduce the domestic (and foreign) producers’ profits in the 
MQS equilibrium with trade may increase the D producers’ profits if the loss of variable profits 
causes the foreign producers to exit the market. 
 
Empirical Methodology 
In this section I describe a double-hurdle version of a gravity equation model to test if changes in 
MQS imposed by federal marketing orders are influencing trade patterns. Gravity-equation models 
have  been  widely  used  in  the  empirical  literature  on  the  determinants  of  bilateral  trade  flows. 
Gravity-equation specifications suggest that the value of trade between two countries is positively 
related to the per capita GDP of the two countries and inversely related to the geographic distance 
between the two locations. Although initially the empirical specification was ad hoc, Leamer and 
Stern (1970) showed that there was an acceptable theoretical foundation for the common empirical 
specification. 
  The  empirical  evidence  surrounding  the  impacts  on  trade  from  standards  in  general  is 
extremely limited (Maskus and Wilson, 2000), and empirical research specifically related to affects 
of MQS on trade patterns is essentially nonexistent. Increasingly stringent international food safety 
standards  have  prompted  a  few  studies  (e.g.,  Otsuki  et  al.,  2001;  Anders  and  Caswell,  2006) 
investigating the trade impact of these standards using gravity equations. As the costs associated 
with compliance with these standards is not necessarily trivial and imports not meeting the standards 
are rejected and returned to the importing country, applications in this area are not far removed from 
the MQS situation. Due to data limitations, the few studies in this area have used indicator variables 
to account for changes in stringency of standards. Otsuki et al. (2001) used the level of the standard   19 
(i.e., maximum level of aflatoxins) as an independent variable, initiating the use of a continuous 
variable in a gravity equation setting to determine how alterations of the standard influence trade 
flows. 
In order to ascertain the aggregate effect of the implementation of, or a change in, a MQS for a 
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where  ijt EX  is the value of a particular commodity exported to country i (the U.S.) from country j 
at time t,  j    are exporting country fixed-effects,  t    are time fixed-effects,  jt ) (    is the time-
importer interaction effect,  it GDP  and  jt GDP  is the Real Per Capita Gross Domestic Product of the 
U.S. at time t and exporting country j at time t, respectively,  ij DIST is the geographical distance 
between the U.S. and country j,  it STND  represents n indicator variables to account for changes in 
MQS,  ijt ER  is the exchange rate between the U.S. and country j at time t,  ijt FCR  accounts for total 
currency  reserves,  ij TP represents  L  indicator  variables  to  account  for  longstanding  trade 
relationships,  it SS  is a set of indicator variables to account for non-strategic seasonal variations in 
MQS, and  ijt    is an independent and identically distributed log normal error term with mean zero. 
This  model  specification  can  be  estimated  for  each  of  the  commodities  for  which  production 
occurs under the auspices of a federal marketing order and where MQS have changed within the 
previous 10 year period.  
Incorporating  exporting  country  fixed-effects  into  the  gravity  equation  specification  will 
absorb all time-invariant, country-specific characteristics (Matyas, 1997). The inclusion of year   20 
fixed-effects into the empirical specification will capture cyclical influences (i.e., business cycles) 
common  across  all  countries  in  the  sample  (Kandogan,  2004).  Because  variations  in  trading 
volumes could emanate from unobservable differences across countries or time, the inclusion of 
fixed-effects  for  each  of  these  components  will  absorb  the  variation  in  import  volume  not 
attributable to the covariates included in the empirical specification. Historical trade relationships 
can create trade dependencies among countries and thereby act as nontariff barriers that could 
affect  importers’  responses  to  changes  in  regulations.  Finally,  exporter-time  fixed  effects  will 
capture any time-varying, country-specific characteristics such as factor endowments or cultural or 
political factors that contribute to determining trade flows (Baltagi et al., 2003). Because it is 
impossible  to  include  all  of  the  covariates  that  influence  the  value  of  imports  of  a  particular 
commodity from one country to another, not including the main and first-order interaction fixed-
effects could create bias emanating from the omission of variables.    
The value of the importing country’s GDP acts as a proxy for its buying power while the 
exporting  country’s  GDP  acts  as  a  proxy  for  its  production  capacity  (Kandogan,  2004). 
Consequently, as either importing or exporting country GDP increases, the value of imports is also 
anticipated to increase. Ceteris paribus, it is expected that increases in the exchange rate will cause 
the value of imports to decline because the relative price of imported goods in terms of domestic 
goods is increasing.  
Matyas  (1997)  was  the  first to  incorporate  total  foreign  currency  reserves  into  the  gravity 
equation specification to act as a measure of exchange rate stability. It is expected that as the level 
of total currency reserves increases, exchange rates are likely to be increasingly stable, and the 
value  of  imports  is  predicted  to  increase.  Because  distance  between  importing  and  exporting 
countries acts as a proxy for shipping costs, the coefficient on the distance variable is expected to   21 
be negative, as shipping costs are increasing in the distance that products must travel. Due to the 
perishability and bulkiness of most agricultural commodities, I would expect transportation costs, 
and thereby distance, to be a significant consideration for importers.  
Many  fruit  and  vegetable  federal  marketing  orders  enforce  varying  degrees  of  quality 
requirements throughout the year. These regulations are imposed due to the seasonality associated 
with  production  and  are  not  frequently  adjusted.  Consequently,  these  indicator  variables  are 
included separately from the MQS regulation indicator variables ( it SS ) to account for seasonal 
variations in imports which are strategic on the part of importers to take advantage of seasonal 
variations in the stringency of requirements.
8  
In  some  cases  it  may  be  necessary  to  be  concerned  with  the  potential  simultaneity  bias 
associated  with  the  inclusion  of  the  MQS  regulation  indicator  variable(s)  because  federal 
marketing order boards have incentive to implement or increase stringency of MQS when imports 
are high. Given the significant lags associated with adjusting production practices and the time 
lapse between the submission of regulatory standards and their approval, I believe it unlikely that 
standards and trade performance will be determined simultaneously and therefore the estimates 
obtained from the empirical specification will not be biased from this source.  
The use of the level of the standard as opposed to utilizing indicator variables to account for 
changes in the stringency of standards was pioneered by Otsuki et al. (2001). Due to the panel 
nature of the data and the presence of statistical variation in the MQS set by federal marketing 
boards, it will be possible for me utilize this variable specification. In situations where the change 
in the MQS was small, the original specification could be implemented.  
                                                 
8 The ecological cycle and perishable nature of agriculture commodities usually dictate that products are picked, 
packed, and shipped based on planting decisions made well in advance of harvest. Therefore, for fruits and vegetables 
there is little room for the strategic inventory decisions within a planting period.  
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Theory  suggests  that  the  imposition  of  excessively  stringent  MQS  will  cause  importers  to 
reduce shipments for inspection to reduce their costs. Consequently, if the coefficient(s) on the 
MQS variable(s) are negative and significant, then increasingly stringent MQS have a negative 
impact on the value of imports. This is an indication that foreign producers’ products are not able 
to meet the MQS or that they are shipping less product in response to the regulation change, 
thereby  implying  that  the  MQS  are  generating  a  barrier  to  trade.  It  should  be  noted  that  the 
coefficient estimate(s) on the MQS variable(s) are not constrained and therefore could indicate that 
standards are either trade enhancing or trade detracting (Beghin and Bureau, 2001).  
 
Issues in Estimation 
Most gravity-equation models use ordinary least squares to estimate a simple log-linear model and 
omit the observations for which the dependent variable is zero. As most studies employing gravity 
equation specifications seek to explain aggregate bilateral trading patterns, only a small fraction of 
the  total  number  of  observations  must  be  omitted  from  estimation  due  to  zero  values.
9  When 
considering disaggregated data in terms of either region (e.g., Zahniser et al., 2002) or commodity 
(e.g.,  Hillberry,  2002)  the  number  of  observations  where  no  trade  flows  are  observed  increase 
substantially. The seasonality associated with agricultural production in particular generates many 
observations where the value of imports is zero. When there are a large number of observations for 
which no trade flows are observed, the error term describing the data-generating process cannot be 
assumed  to  be  symmetric  (Hillberry,  2002).  Consequently,  estimating  only  positive  trade  flow 
                                                 
9 Hillberry (2002) shows that, when the data contain a small proportion (1.9%) of observations where no trade flows 
are observed, omitting those observations and estimating the simple log-linear model with ordinary least squares is 
statistically  equivalent  to  using  a  double-hurdle  model  to  correct  for  the  observations  where  no  trade  flows  are 
observed.    23 
observations when a significant proportion of the observations are omitted will cause estimates to 
suffer from sample selection bias.  
Two  classes  of  econometric  models  have  been  used  to  estimate  gravity  equation  models  to 
account  for  the  zero  observations  and  their  effect  on  empirical  estimates.  Since  the  dependent 
variable, the value of imports, is continuously distributed when trade flows are positive but is zero 
with some positive probability, Zahniser et al.(2002) utilized a tobit model to guard against sample 
selection bias and to ensure that trade flow predictions are positive. Hillberry (2002) argues that 
there is no basis to assume that there is a relationship between the positive observations and those 
observations for which no trade flows occur, which is an underlying implication of sample-selection 
models. Consequently, Hillberry estimated commodity-specific gravity equations using a double-
hurdle model originally proposed by Cragg (1971). Cragg suggested that there are instances where 
the decision to act and the degree of response to the decision are not closely related. For example, it 
is easy to imagine that the decision to export is not directly related to the amount of product which is 
exported. 
To account for this phenomenon empirically, Cragg suggests utilizing two independent equations 
to determine (a) the probability associated with observing positive import value and (b) the value of 
imports conditional on some positive import value being observed. In the original rendition of the 
model, the first equation is a standard probit model to determine the probability associated with 
observing  a  positive  import  value  given  the  independent  variables.  The  second  equation  is  a 
truncated regression model which places a lower bound on the error distribution. This specification 
is  referred  to  as  a  double-hurdle  model  because,  in  order  to  observe  a  positive  value  for  the 
dependent variable, it must be that (i) the decision was affirmative (i.e., a country chooses to enter 
the export market) and (ii) a positive amount is chosen given the previous decision (i.e., a country   24 
must choose to export a positive amount of the commodity given that the decision was made to enter 
the export market).  
Estimating the two equations separately generates parameter estimates that do not depend on 
some assumed relationship between the decision to import and the amount which a country chooses 
to import. Due to the aggregate nature of the data, it is not possible to discern individual firm 
decisions  regarding  the  decision  to  export.  Consequently,  there  is  no  reason  to  assume  that  the 
aggregate decision to export (i.e., all of the firms in one country deciding individually not to export) 
is related to the amount exported if firms individually choose to export. In order to observe a positive 
value of imports from a particular nation, the relevant trade conditions (e.g., tariffs, quotas, distance, 
etc.) must be favorable. Given that the trade conditions induce individual firms to decide to enter the 
export market, each will decide on the amount to export, which will depend on individual-firm 
characteristics (e.g., capacity, technology, labor, etc.). Therefore, the decision to enter the export 
market will not necessarily be directly related to the sum of the individual firm decisions regarding 
the amount exported. Thus, a double-hurdle model is more favorable then a tobit model in this 
context.  
The error terms of the two regressions that comprise the double-hurdle model are often assumed 
to be normally and independently distributed. However, in order to overcome the inconsistency of 
estimates caused by heteroskedasticity or nonnormality of error terms, adjustments to the original 
specification must be made. To adjust for heteroskedastic errors within this model specification, it is 
common to choose the functional form and variables to include in the function to allow the variance 
of the errors to differ across observations (Newman et al., 2003). To allow for nonnormality of error 
terms  in  this  maximum  likelihood  estimation  framework,  an  inverse  hyperbolic  sine  (IHS) 
transformation of the dependent variable is often used (Yen and Jensen, 1996). Originally posited by   25 
Burbidge, Magee, and Robb (1988) the IHS can be utilized on random variables that can take on any 
values.
10   
 
Data 
The bilateral trade volume data utilized in this study are from the Foreign Agriculture Service (FAS) 
database developed and maintained by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). This 
data are available on a monthly basis from January 1989 to September 2007 at the Harmonized 
Trade System (HTS) 10-digit code level. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) data, both real and 
nominal, are provided by the USDA Economic Research Service (ERS) and are available on an 
annual basis. The International Financial Statistics Branch of the International Monetary Fund and 
the  Financial  Statistics  Branch  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  provide  the  real  country  monthly 
average exchange rate data, in local currency per real U.S. dollar with 2000 as the base. The data on 
individual country longitude and latitude coordinates and their distances from the U.S. was provided 
by the Centre d’Estudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationals (CEPII). CEPII uses the “main 
city” of each country, usually the capital city unless the capital did not have a sufficient population 
to warrant the designation of the economic center, to calculate distances measures using the greater 
circle  distance  formula.  This  data  set  also  provides  information  regarding  common  languages, 
colonization, and common borders.  
 
Conclusion 
Although  volume-control  provisions  and  promotion  programs  implemented  by  marketing  orders 
have been studied extensively, little attention has been given to minimum quality standards (MQS). 
                                                 
10 An alternative approach would be to use semiparametric estimation techniques so that distributional assumptions 
and transformations would be unnecessary.     26 
Yet, the high incidence of utilization of the section 8e provisions, coupled with high degree of 
variability of standards exhibited over the previous 10 years, and the seeming opportunities to use 
these provisions to gain strategic advantages serve to motivate further research on how these MQS 
are influencing trade patterns. This question is of direct policy relevance as trade negotiations focus 
increasingly on nontariff barriers.  
A significant amount of work on the economic implications of MQS has been conducted during 
the past two decades.  However, virtually all of this research is theoretical in nature, and in some 
cases, has little relevance to the types of regulations that domestic agricultural industries can impose 
under  the  auspices  of  federal  marketing  orders.  This  paper  has  studied  the  impacts  of  a  MQS 
imposed by an agricultural industry under the auspices of marketing order legislation in a free-trade 
environment.  The  theoretical  model  incorporates  contemporary  methodology  from  the  general 
economics literature on MQS, the key characteristics of agricultural production, and the endogenous 
nature of the decision of whether or not to adopt a MQS. The theoretical model suggests that MQS 
that domestic producers choose to impose will be detrimental to societal welfare and their foreign 
competitors.  
An  empirical  specification  was  also  proposed  to  test  whether  not  augmentations  to  MQS 
imposed by U.S. producers via federal marketing orders affect bilateral trade flows. A double-hurdle 
version of a gravity equation model was developed to test if changes in MQS imposed by federal 
marketing orders are influencing trade patterns based upon disaggregate, commodity-level data.   27 
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